Friday, August 26, 2016

The Hugo awards and the decay of Western civilisation

The Hugos, for those unaware, are (speculative fiction/science fiction/fantasy) SF awards voted on by people at Worldcon.  Along with the Nebulas, they have long been the premier awards in SF. A few years ago, some SF writers got together and decided to push back against [what they saw as] the drift of the awards from their original function--representing excellence in SF writing, editing, etc--to concerns with demographic inclusion (and ideological exclusion) as well as a drift to stories with more literary pretension but less genre content.

In other words, the replacement of questions of what (the best writing, etc) with questions of who (race, gender, sexuality, etc) while diluting the original SF focus. The drifting concern to questions of who claims to be about "inclusion" but, as is normal with modern progressivist identitarian politics, said inclusion was a basis for cognitive exclusion--excluding folk whose views were taken to be, by definition, against (the correct sort of) "inclusion". 

Thus, being a Mormon, libertarian-inclined, registered Republican who used to own a gun shop was being the wrong sort of who. Writer Sarah Hoyt has blogged about the feeling of vulnerability being of conservative or libertarian views generated for up-and-coming writers within the field. (At least, outside the specific sub-genre of military SF, which is rife with writers of such views.)

This drift towards concern with writer demography and away from genre content is classic trumping of function by Virtue. In particular, the ideology, partisan-affiliation and occupation of a writer has nothing to do with the original function of the Hugos. It can only matter if other criteria are used to trump said function.

A key element of morality is precisely that it trumps, that it claims an authority greater than alternative considerations. Such authority is inherently pervasive (it can apply to anything) and easily tied to status claims (supporting a trumping authority easily also proclaims a trumping moral status).

As we homo sapiens are moralising, status-conscious coalition builders, it is very easy for morality to generate in-groups and out-groups and to accentuate the divide between them. (As moral psychologist Jonathan Haidt says, morality both binds and blinds: a nice short discussion of which is here.) The classic Scott Alexander post (essay really) I can tolerate anything except the outgroup very much applies.

The original pushback against said demographic-concern-and-literary-elevation drift was the Sad Puppies, an attempt to widen the nomination process by suggesting to Worldcon voters writers and others felt to be more in keeping with notions of SF being very much a specific genre about stories and playing with ideas in general (rather than about who and which ideas).

There was also an issue of whether a particular publishing house (Tor books) had been gaming the system. (It has topped SF awards in general, though Gollancz has a higher author/nomination to award rate.) 

As an open reaction to a drift among publishing and organisation insiders, the Sad Puppies made explicitly contentious processes that had presented as apolitical and meritocratic. That immediately made the insurgents open to charges of "politicising" and "gaming" the system. Always useful rhetoric for status quo insiders against trouble-makers. Hence also claims that the Sad Puppies campaign was just about getting awards for oneself and one's friends. That Larry Corriera, the original Sad Puppy organiser, had recused himself from nomination was just ignored or scoffed at. 

The Virtue syllogism
But the Sad Puppy pushback also ran into the trumping nature of Virtue. A standard response to concerns with preserving function against claims of moral Virtue is to wield the following (invalid) syllogism
We are doing x because of Y.
You object to us doing x.
You are against Y.
In this case: 
We are attending to questions of who-category to make the Hugos more inclusive-by-demographic category as a matter of Social Justice.
You object to the changing the criteria for the Hugos in this way.
You are against inclusion and Social Justice.
It was thus "established", as is normal when the Virtue game gets going, that all and any objection to what the Virtuous were doing was, by definition, due to malefic motivations. There being no legitimate objection to Virtue, of course. Thus there is also no legitimate objection to having Virtue trump function.

In accordance with the status-drive (we're moral, they're evil/stupid/ignorant) which is so crucial to Virtue coalition-building, there was an associated Narrative, a story of Good people, who seek inclusiveness, and Bad people, who oppose it (and so, should, of course, be excluded). 

As supporters of the Sad Puppies constantly point out (e.g. Larry Correira here, Brad Torgersen here), people and facts that fail to confirm this Narrative, or actively undermine it, are just ignored.

As is normal when the Virtue game gets going, not only is function trumped, so are facts.

A striking feature of the Hugos controversy, is that outlets such as The Guardian, The New Republic, The Atlantic, Wired, Salon and Slate all covered it. And they all covered it in the same way: as the heroic supporters of inclusion and social justice being opposed by those against demographic diversity in SF (and social diversity more generally). There was, apparently, no legitimate concern about function, and any facts that suggested otherwise typically just never appeared in the Narrative. Which thus became a deeply dishonest Narrative. One that undermined the alleged function of mainstream media--to report the news of what happens, not Virtuous distortions of the same. (An example of covering the issue somewhat differently is provided by Real Clear Politics and, after some corrections, the UK Telegraph.)

Amusingly, Entertainment Weekly, after enthusiastically joining in the game, managed, in its correction, to allude to what was happening:
CORRECTION: After misinterpreting reports in other news publications, EW published an unfair and inaccurate depiction of the Sad Puppies voting slate, which does, in fact, include many women and writers of color. As Sad Puppies’ Brad Torgerson explained to EW, the slate includes both women and non-caucasian writers, including Rajnar Vajra, Larry Correia, Annie Bellet, Kary English, Toni Weisskopf, Ann Sowards, Megan Gray, Sheila Gilbert, Jennifer Brozek, Cedar Sanderson, and Amanda Green.
This story has been updated to more accurately reflect this. EW regrets the error.
It does repeat the pattern of using Brad Torgersen as the go-to Sad Puppy to be quoted, since his terribly Teutonic name is just made to fit the Narrative. (His African-American wife, perhaps less so, but she can easily be ignored.)

Having designated Virtue systematically trump function and facts is not a good long-term look for any society or civilisation. But the Virtue game has become very socially pervasive.

Hence the importance of not allowing any successful push-backs. Hence the mainstream media (1) paying attention to the Hugo fuss and (2) pushing the Virtuous Narrative so relentlessly. Thereby, of course, demonstrating just how pervasive Virtuous trumping of facts and function has become.

The identity dynamic
The Sad Puppies rapidly became not the only insurgent players. The Virtuous drift was a manifestation of the identitarian progressivism that has replaced the modernist Left: the politics of who replacing the politics of what

Fundamental to identitarian progressivism is not merely the pushing of positive Identities but also negative ones. A story of good Who's who are oppressed by bad Who's. Those bad Who's being, of course, Bad White People, unrepentant possessors of White Privilege. (Who are very, very distinct from Good White People--those being the folk who spend so much time explaining how oppressed Good Who's are by Bad White People.) 

Bad White People thereby become the default social scapegoats. Thomas Sowell's nomination for the stupidest idea in politics:
the assumption that people would be evenly or randomly distributed in incomes, institutions, occupations or awards, in the absence of somebody doing somebody wrong.
is a very useful idea for identitarian progressivism and its Virtue game. [Including for the bureaucratised versions thereof.]

There is no good form of identity politics. But there is an inevitable dynamic to identity politics: an identity under continuing attack will begin to organise in sheer self-defence (or, at least be susceptible to political entrepreneurs who claim to speak for them). For, if being queer, coloured, female, etc are good identities, then it follows that being a heterosexual white male is a bad (i.e. morally stained aka "privileged") identity.

One can escape from said moral stain by proclaiming very loudly how committed to Virtue (aka Social Justice) one is, thereby establishing oneself as a Good White. In the case of the Hugos, writers such as George R R Martin (e.g. here and here) and John Scalzi have perfected this. In Scalzi's case, he is particularly keen on pushing that there is no legitimate complaint about or against Virtue (e.g. here).

Given that pushing morally-positive identities must involve creating morally-negative identities (which is why there is no good form of identity politics), the rise of progressivist identitarian politics and its constructs of bad/stained identities has, inevitably, seen the rise of antagonistic identitarian politics (aka the Alt-right).  

This is very convenient to progressivist identitarian politics, because the Alt-right give
someone for the Good Whites to point to and say See! See! Bad Whites! (John Scalzi plays this game here.)

The notion that only "good people" will play identity politics was always deeply stupid. But it is a convenient stupidity for the Good White game. Particularly as it is simplicity itself to push the See, Bad Whites! narrative--just completely ignore any role for progressivist identitarian politics in creating this, completely predictable, reaction.

... in wider society
As an aside, movement conservatism in the US has a decades-long history of purging right-identitarians--nicely documented in an excellent work of history and analysis, Right Wing Critics of American Conservatism by political scientist George Hawley: useful reviews of the book by the excluded are here, here and here

The rise of progressivist identitarian politics has, however, destabilised movement conservatism's suppression of identitarian politics on the right as the Alt-right's fundamental claim (the interests, culture, standing, prospects and interests of white people are under attack) is now true for non-progressivist white folk, particularly the white working class, given their role as default social scapegoats. (Hence the success of The Donald.) 

The US is now facing the natural dynamic of identity politics--the rise of awful candidates who folk feel compelled to vote for due to tribal self-defence. Given that Hillary is the doyen of progressivist identity politics, and the Greens' Jill Stein is a case of the same game even more so, the only US Presidential candidate which represents any revolt against the toxic dynamics of identity politics is the Libertarian, Gary Johnson: the only candidate for (in the nice phrasing of Frederik deBoer and others) the politics of what rather than the politics of who.

Going Rabid
In the case of the Hugos, the anti-progressive identitarians are the Rabid Puppies, pushed by prominent Alt-right blogger, SF writer and publisher, Vox Day. (His politics are really not mine, but his SJWs Always Lie: Taking Down the Thought Police is a necessary read to understand the methodological dynamics of Virtue coalition politics in the wider culture.)

Vox Day's clash with Sad Puppy supporter Sarah Hoyt provides an excellent example of how dishonest the Virtuous Narrative about the Sad Puppies is. Sarah Hoyt--woman, Portuguese immigrant--is a poster child for how objecting to changing the function of the Hugos is not about opposing diversity. Hence the mainstream media journalists "reporting" (actually selling Narrative fiction as news) have comprehensively ignored her.

Sarah Hoyt manifests the US as open society and sees herself as doing so. To the Alt-right, this is the fiction of the US as propositional nation. But the Rabid Puppy surge also shows how hard it is for non-identitarian politics to maintain itself once the identitarian dynamics of tribalism and counter-tribalism gets going.

Virtue trumping fact and function. The toxic dynamics of identity politics. The Hugos are a much bigger story than they appear because they are a revealing microcosm of destructive processes in our civilisation.

[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Tuesday, August 9, 2016

Defending openness with cognitive closure

The Economist recently had a piece claiming that the left-right divide had been overtaken by the open-closed divide. It had this to say on the Brexit vote: 
So far, Britain’s decision to leave the European Union has been the anti-globalists’ biggest prize: the vote in June to abandon the world’s most successful free-trade club was won by cynically pandering to voters’ insular instincts, splitting mainstream parties down the middle.
Really? There were no legitimate concerns behind the Brexit vote?

Two-thirds of British voters voted for the EEC (i.e. the European Communities aka Common Market) in 1975, yet a 52-48% majority voted against the EU in 2016. Had British voters suddenly become more stupid or gullible in the intervening 41 years? Or had circumstances changed? Had what they were being sold changed?

No, yes and yes.

A different Europe
Immigration has accelerated, and its implications have changed. The approved model has gone from assimilation (newcomers adapt to residents) to multiculturalism (residents adapt to newcomers) along with a Muslim religious revival which accentuates visible differences in clothing (pdf) and associates it with violence. (An immigration policy which kills citizens is a problematic immigration policy: particularly when it does so into the second generation.)

The provincial working class lost political defenders as the modernist left became postmodern progressivism. Importing new voters reduces the provincial working class's political significance further while increasing pressure on government services and redistributing the benefits of economic growth away from the indigenous working class.

The Economist tells us that Brexit was a vote against:
the world’s most successful free-trade club ...
The EEC was the most successful free trade area, the EU is very much not--not a successful free trade area (thanks to the Euro, economic growth has flatlined in much of the EU) as well as not just a free trade area but something which aspires to far more. Over 40 years of experience had greatly reduced voter support for the EU-that-is compared to the EEC-that-was.

Nor did it help that the UK did not join the Euro. First, the Euro is a huge statement of future intent. Secondly, it was a dramatic demonstration of EU failure, of how not joining in the Ever Greater Union roller-coaster could be a very good idea. Just as it did not help that the UK had not opted to join the Schengen agreement, for essentially the same reasons.

Treating opposition to the actually-existing-EU as simply malefic opposition to "openness" is being remarkably obtuse. One does not defend an open society with such cognitive closure.

There is evidence that the EU continues to (on balance) continues to increase economic freedom. Faced, however, with a choice between increased accountability and increased economic freedom, I will pick increased accountability every time: it is so much the better long term bet. Indeed, it precisely the way that EU processes profoundly muddied who was responsible for what which helps explain the popular antipathy.

Undermining social bargaining
The Economist cites the EU as an example of international integration. In a phrase, institutionalised globalisation.

Economist Kevin O'Rourke (whose work with Jeffrey Williamson is necessary reading to understand the nature of globalisation) has pointed out that globalisation produces losers, that the Brexit backlash "has been a long time coming". His immediate conclusion is that the solution to more immigration is more government services, citing economist Dani Rodrik's claim that markets and states are complements.

This is to misread the evidence he is citing about European states in the C19th and early C20th. Yes, more highly taxed states were more open, but this was more consequence than cause. They were able to sustain the (relatively) high tax/high openness balance by having inclusive and effective social bargaining. Which is precisely what the pomo progressivist embrace of language taboos, the rhetoric of denunciation (racist! sexist! xenophobic! etc), identity politics, judicial activism (specifically, social change by judicial decision) and internationalisation all seriously undermine.

In particular, much of the function of contemporary immigrant politics [about immigration] is precisely to strip status and positive attention from the resident (white) working class, which leads to precisely the politics of neglect O'Rourke is complaining about. 

Why on earth would one think that, given the dynamics of contemporary politics, expanded government action would be to the benefit of the backlash voters? Ask the residents of Rotherham how much the Progressivist Ascendancy state is not on their side. 

The historical cases that O'Rourke is citing were also not immigrant states; if anything, they were emigrant states. His suggestion that supporters of openness, in effect, tell citizens that they should pay higher taxes (either now, or in the future through greater public debt) to expand services to incorporate extra migrants just pushes the political scarcity problems to the next level.

Moreover, the more diverse the incoming migrants, the more difficult inclusive social bargaining becomes, due to increased diversity in preferences and expectations and increased difficulties in information flows. Conversely, mass emigration tends to select for more social conformity among the remaining population, as those who differ are more likely emigrate, thereby making inclusive social bargaining easier among the citizens who stay.

It is so much easier to have a high services/high openness social bargaining in overwhelmingly monocultural societies (Scandinavia) or explicitly specific-pillar societies (Netherlands) or in highly decentralised ones (Switzerland). There is a reason why the much more diverse Anglo societies tended to have lower levels of tax/openness trade-offs and why the (over-centralised) United Kingdom had and has perennial Celtic fringe problems. 

It is all very well to talk of the "open v closed" divide, but not if one is going to treat concerns about openness as stupid/malefic and integration projects as simply good things. Seriously damaged processes of social bargaining are the issue to zero in on, not alleged voter stupidity or malice, nor treating increased government services as any sort of likely panacea.

[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Friday, July 29, 2016

Barry Goldwater is not responsible for The Donald

Blaming The Donald on Sen. Barry Goldwater is essentially the claim of this Vox piece

Barry Goldwater (1909-1998) was the libertarian-inclined Republican Senator who won the Republican presidential nomination in 1964 and was then defeated in a 61% to 39% electoral landslide by LBJ. The strong on national security, rhetorically keen on small government strain of politics that Goldwater represented may have lost the 1964 US Presidential election, but it went on to become increasingly powerful within the Republican Party, leading to Ronald Reagan's nomination and successful two-term Presidency (three-term, in effect, with Bush Snr's 1988 win).

Sen. Goldwater famously articulated a federalist opposition to the (federal) Civil Rights Act of 1964, swapping (declining) African-American support for Republicans for the votes of (much more numerous) Southern whites. At least in the long term--it did not do much for Goldwater himself and it was not until 1994 (i.e. 30 years later) that the South finally forgave the Republican Party for the Civil War. And that on the basis of the Contract with America, which was conspicuously non-racial in its content.

Goldwater's opting for "states rights" over civil rights, a seminal moment in the Republican Party's Southern strategy, has long been treated by progressivists as the Original Sin of the modern Republican Party. Reagan's success (as with Margaret Thatcher's in the UK) was part of a general tendency to market liberalisation that outraged many progressives, who took it as a vile de-railing of the "proper direction" of History and for whom the only proper path for the Republicans was to be a pale and compliant version of the Democrats. Whenever the "culture wars" heat up, this Origin Sin is trotted out to explain why the Republicans are wrong/evil/stupid/ignorant. With the nomination of The Donald being an excellent vehicle for revisiting this hardy perennial.

LBJ himself commented that the Civil Rights Act would mean losing the South for a generation. Actually, it took a generation for the Democrats to lose the South, at least at a Congressional level. (The Republicans did better in the South in Presidential elections from 1964 onwards.) But his underlying instinct was surely correct: by embracing civil rights so emphatically, and setting itself up as essentially the monopoly-political-provider for African-Americans, the Democrats were driving away lots of Southern whites: in a two-Party system, that meant to the Republicans.

It is obviously true that lots Southern whites went off and voted Republican, first in Presidential elections and eventually in Congressional ones (though the evidence on white racism in general is a lot more equivocal).

What precisely did they get regarding racial politics for voting Republican? (Noting that opposing policies touted as anti-racist is not the same as being racist.) A black Supreme Court Judge, a black Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, two black Secretaries of State, a black RNC chair, an Indian Governor of Louisiana. Was there any rollback of civil rights? Application of pro-white racial criteria for anything? Some rhetorical winks and nods is the most one can reasonably claim. And even there, these are often over-claimed. [Though voting law shenanigans remain a hardy perennial.]

The Republican Party was where white racism (to the extent that it did) went off to be politically frustrated. White racism got far, far less from the Republican Party post-1964 than it did from the Democratic Party pre-1960. For two reasons: first, the identity as the Party of Lincoln still had rhetorical power among Republicans (as Sen. Trent Lott discovered) and, secondly, the US was becoming a far less racist society than it had been. The penalties among the wider electorate, and within the business and professional classes who provide money and staff, of open racism was much greater than the benefits, and have been getting more so all the time.

There is a parallel in the mid-C19th origins of the Republican Party, where it took over nativist sentiment and finessed into opposition to Slave Power, proceeding to preside for decades over massive immigration. The C19th Republican Party was the place that nativism went to be frustrated. In last decades of the C20th, the Republican Party repeated the performance with white Southerners (at least as regards racism), with Soviet Power playing a somewhat analogous role to Slave Power. (With the added resonance that the Soviet Union revived state slavery, with its labour camp system, and even serfdom, with its 1940-1955 ban on workers changing employment without management approval.)

Then along comes The Donald, clearly appealing to white tribalism. His appeal started off not among people the Republican Party had successfully actively engaged, but folk that it had not. Which fitted with him not actually being a Republican in any serious sense. This 52 years after the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 36 years after the "Reagan Democrats" marking a long drift of white working class voters from the Democrats to the Republicans.

Clearly, something else has been going on. (What that is, is the subject of my next [a later] post). But, whatever it is, it is not Barry Goldwater's fault.

[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Monday, July 25, 2016

A rebuke to crony unionism

The Country Fire Authority (CFA) of Victoria has 60,000 volunteer firefighters to fight fires, particularly bushfires, outside the area covered by the Metropolitan Fire Brigade (MFB). CFA volunteers are deeply linked in with their local communities and represent a huge saving to the Victorian taxpayer. The CFA represents a fine example of practical social capital.

As Victoria's urban population increases, the interactions between the CFA and the MFB increase and the number of politicians, staffers, bureaucrats and union leaders who have little or no connection or interaction with rural Victoria also increases. The MFB staff are covered by the UFU (United Firefighers Union). As part of bargaining for an enterprise agreement, the UFU has been pushing for more operational control by the MFB over the CFA.

Let's pause here: why is this a matter for an enterprise agreement? Why is it a union demand at all? Because it elevates the standing and prospects of (urban) firefighters over (as it happens) rural volunteers? Can one see the little political problem here?

Informative outlines of the dispute are here and here. In a useful discussion of the dispute, journalist Sally Whyte tells us that:
Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews was originally against the UFU when it came to the deal’s veto proposal, but he changed his mind after a meeting with UFU boss Peter Marshall without Emergency Services Minister Jane Garrett. 
So, a union uses its inside track access to get political support against a volunteer based organisation. The politics of who's in and who's not.

One of the tricks of being a successful Labor Premier is when to say "no" to a union. Including paying attention to the optics, to how things look. Everyone knows that the Australian Labor Party is deeply connected to the union movement, which actually makes the optics more important. Particularly as said Minister has, indeed, since resigned. This goes with the Government's sacking of the CFA Board and the resignation of its chief officer. 

This looks a lot like yet again inside-the-bubble-connected urbanites not getting how important status, authority and control are to folk who live mostly outside looking in. In a sense, it doesn't matter who is "right" (since that depends a lot on your perspective), it is that politics is about managing disputes. If you lose a Minister, sack a board and then have the chief officer resigned, this is not a well-managed dispute. If you get lots of angry volunteers from an iconic organisation agitating against your Party in a federal election, it is bad politics, no matter how you look at it.

Political costs
On which point, consider that (very close) federal election:
NSW: ALP gains 4 seat.
Queensland: ALP gains 1 seat.
WA: ALP gains 2 seats.
SA: ALP gain 1 seats.
Tasmania: ALP gains 3 seats,
NT: ALP gains 1 seat.
Victoria: Coalition gains 1 seat.

Pick the odd State/Territory out. If Victoria had performed as well as other States for the ALP in the recent Australian federal election, the Coalition would not have have achieved a Parliamentary majority: something that folk within the ALP have noticed.

As Sally Whyte noted of the CFA dispute:
It has been all over the front pages of the Herald Sun, with CFA volunteers and residents affected by Black Saturday quoted in an attempt to attack Andrews. Do people really understand the intricacies of the deal? Probably not — but when Victorians consider who they trust more, the heroic CFA or a politician, the Premier is not going to come out of this battle unscathed.
Why was this a dispute even worth having? What gain in public policy was worth this political pain? And if was a genuine gain in public policy, why couldn't one convince volunteers who give up their time and put themselves at risk to save property and lives?

But that would take treating people outside the connected-circle seriously: something Premier Andrews has apparently, and conspicuously, failed to do. Given he was educated in Wangaratta and raised on a cattle farm, one would think he would have a bit more of a nuanced political sense on the matter. But apparently an adulthood spent entirely immersed in urban Labor politics has trumped that. Or the union was very persuasive.

Crony politics
When folk complain of crony capitalism (which the Economist magazine has constructed an index of), they mean two (related) things: people commercially advantaged by their connections to power-holders and good public policy being sacrificed to those connections. Prominent academic and Governor of the Reserve Bank of India Raghuram Rajan pithily and perceptively outlined the appeal and problems of crony capitalism and corruption in a 2014 speech. But one can also have crony unionism: union leaders gaining advantages for them and their members from their connections to power-holders and good public policy being sacrificed to those connections.

Ironically, the Western country which likely suffers most from crony unionism is the United States. The effect is concentrated in particular cities and states--dominated by the Democrats as functionally one-Party jurisdictions--where the effect of crony unionism on the cost, efficiency and effectiveness of government services has ranged from the unfortunate to the disastrous. Crony unionism was a major factor in the bankruptcy of Detroit, and its decades-long decline as a city, as it also is in the fiscal problems of California and other States.

When the Deakinite Settlement dominated Australian public policy, the arbitration system in a sense regularised crony unionism. The regularisation had the advantage of minimising corruption risks, but it still advantaged the politically-connected and imposed major distortions on (pdf) public policy and costs on the wider community.

While the Deakinite Settlement has been significantly dismantled, the arbitration system lives on, if in somewhat attenuated form, notably via the Fair Work Commission. (Pausing here: imagine how a "Fair Sell" Commission would operate--or, rather, let's not.) Consider crony capitalism or crony unionism from the other perspective: the cronies see the aim as having the state apparatus serve their specific interests.

The Labor Party was originally created to be political face of the union movement. It has had considerable political success, though its tendency to split was a problem for decades. Up until 1972, ex-Labor politicians (Cook, Hughes, Lyons) had been in office as non-Labor PMs approaching the length of time as there had actual Labor Federal Governments (Watson, Fisher, Hughes, Scullin, Curtin, Chifley).* Since 1972, however, Labor has been in office federally about the same time as the Coalition.

The combination of a labour movement having an explicit political wing and the arbitration system in various incarnations has led to an Australian union movement that very much sees state power as a tool of protection and expansion. Which is precisely what the CFA dispute looks like.

Allegedly, there is a major public policy gain to be had. (One notices the former Minister did not agree.) But, even if there is, why not find another way to go about it? Either because your understanding of politics and management is so impoverished that does not occur to you, or because what is generating such objections is precisely what one is trying to do.

One of the issues for Western societies is expanding states undermining civil society through replacing non-state efforts and institutions. Given the long-term problems of rural towns, undermining a particularly effective form of social capital is not good for rural Victoria.

Modern progressivism has generated a plethora of techniques for discounting others, for self-congratulating blinding. Likely this is also operating here, in a rather toxic combination with crony unionism.

* Labor PM's Watson, Fisher, Scullin, Curtin, Chifley and Hughes totalled 6,055 days as PM. Cook, Hughes and Lyons totalled 5,376 days as non-Labor PMs, or 89% of the time of actual Labor Federal Governments. Since the 1955 DLP split had a great deal to do with the longevity of Coalition government from 1949-1972, the ALP's habit of splitting was a major political liability.

[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Thursday, July 7, 2016

Public policy: discovery and bargaining or applied knowing?

Is public policy a discovery process which takes into consideration the diverse interests, experiences and perspectives of the political nation (however defined--in a democracy, that is supposed to be the entire citizenry) or is it an engineering problem, an application of applied knowing?

There is, of course, a lot of engineering at the implementation level of public policy. To take some obvious examples, such things as roads, bridges, dams, etc are engineering problems in their construction. But policy in general is full of aspects where technical knowledge is important. Which can easily encourage the belief that policy problems are engineering problems all the way up. But the further up the policy process such a claim is made, then the greater the claims of knowledge, understanding and normative authority one is making for the policy makers.

Conversely, the more sceptical one is about such claims, then the more comfortable one is with the notion that public policy is embedded--and rightfully embedded--in discovery and bargaining processes. Which encourages confidence in multiple levels of government, so that such discovery and bargaining processes can take place in varying jurisdictions among varying players.

The irony of opposition to federalism is that by implying one or more levels of government are redundant, one is making strong claims about the knowledge, understanding and normative authority of the remaining level(s) of government. The implicit notion is that there is a correct policy, which is easily discovered and reliably implemented.

Thus, scepticism about government and political processes encourages belief that there should be more levels of government, not less. (Unless one is so sceptical that one believes there should be none at all: but that entails elevated confidence in non-governmental mechanisms.)

Bargaining and confidence
The more confidence one has in people in general, the more one is likely to endorse broad consent and bargaining mechanisms. The more confidence one has in a specific group of people relative to the wider population, the less so.

The more belief on has in knowledge being dispersed, the stronger sense one is likely to have that policy has to be understood as a discovery process--remembering that social bargaining is itself a discovery process. Noting also that politics is not the only discovery process, nor the only general process for achieving social ends.

The more belief one has in the level of understanding of a specific group or a specific framework of ideas, the more belief one is likely to have that policy is a process of applied knowing which bargaining gets in the way of. In this conception, diversity of policy is simply multiplying error.

Intellectuals and centralised uniformity
It is hardly surprising that intellectuals in general have a tendency to see policy as applied knowing and be impatient with social bargaining and policy diversity. Their life and identity is bound up in their sense of being the people who know more than others, with a strong tendency to also flatter themselves as folk of superior virtue--including the notion that it is their greater knowledge which leads to their superior virtue.

The long arc of history is not flattering to such pretensions, but they are so natural to the work of intellectuals, and so inherently self-flattering, that they retain a perennial appeal. Flowing from these tendencies is their recurring tendency to sneer at the profit-seeking of commerce, so lacking in grand pretensions to virtue and with its lively ordinariness so failing to apply to whatever grand moral schema intellectuals dream up. The claimed grounds and content of virtue have varied enormously, as have the grand moral schemas; but the disparaging contempt for commerce is a hardy perennial across time and space.

The (very) long arc of history has tended to favour policy as discovery-and-bargaining processes, but the temptation to retreat into "but this time we just know!" is also a hardy perennial.

Economics and public policy
The development of economics has tended to point in both directions at once. Mainstream economics tends to be favourable to markets, including markets as discovery processes. But the sense of understanding how things work can lead to deprecating political bargaining as something that gets in the way of good (i.e. economically informed) policy.

An amazing amount of nonsense has been written by academics about "neoliberalism", typically because they never seriously interact with folk who might be in any way sympathetic to "neoliberalism". Neoliberalism has come to mean not much more than "anything vaguely market connected that has been bad since 1980".

If we define neoliberalism as (in the Western context) the application of mainstream economic policy so as to create a sustainable welfare state, then the neoliberal policy surge has, at times, been guilty of seeing political bargaining as "getting in the way". Of it providing an unhelpful obstruction to policy being just applied knowing. Not always--the Hawke Government, in particular, provided an excellent example of accepting that political bargaining was a necessary part of the process. Nevertheless, impatience with political bargaining has been something of a failing of the neoliberal push in policy.

Confusing projects
The polity which has done the most to give neoliberalism a bad name is the EU (European Union). Ironic, in a way, as its bureaucratic aggrandising is not what neoliberalism is supposed to be about. Still, creating a common market for the free flow of goods, services and people looks like a very neoliberal project. As does creating a common currency with a strongly anti-inflation central bank.

But looked at through the prism of political bargaining and policy as discovery process, and the European Union looks a lot less impressive--particularly compared to the European Economic Community (EEC) that proceeded it.

The EEC was a neoliberal project, and a very successful one. A particular virtue being the insistence that only democracies could join. The Common Agricultural Policy was regrettable: a form of political bargaining in a way, but one which seemed an iconic example of narrow, organised special interests triumphing over general interests. Nevertheless, the EEC had a deserved association with prosperity and international cooperation.

The EU, not so much. The EU has become a case study in policy over-reaching. Harmonising regulation has been an example of suppressing policy-as-discovery process and, at best, very narrow social bargaining. Worse, as the reach of the European Project has grown, it has had an increasingly invidious effect on policy making within the member states by becoming a means to avoid accountability for policy actions and consequences by muddying who is responsible for what and providing blaming cover for actions.

But the worst over-reaching has been in the Euro and the ECB (European Central Bank). The idea of the Euro was straightforward--a Deutsche Mark for everyone. Something with very strong appeal, particularly for those used to high inflation "soft" currencies.

The problem with the Euro is that it became a Deutsche Mark for everyone; the entire Eurozone had a monetary policy imposed on it that suited Germany first and others much less, with the greater the differences between a particular economy and the German one, the worst the consequences. The human costs of the Euro alone has made the EU a morally very dubious construction.

Between the costs of the Euro (including fiscal austerity, with the underlying problem being monetary austerity), the deep muddying of policy accountability, and the resulting adverse effects on the quality of policy and sense of popular control, the EU has managed to generate increasing levels of "angry votes", including increasingly nationalistic political movements. How much in any particular country is still mediated by local political circumstances and levels of economic stress, but the wider pattern is clear enough.

Problematising people
Which comes back to the original sin of the EU--the original misdiagnosing of the problem of European history. The origins of the EU were based on the premise that the deep problem of European history was nationalism. This is false: Europeans have never lacked reasons to kill each other.

The deep problem of European history has been unaccountable power. Whether it was dynastically-grounded regimes using the weapon of nationalism to fight off the spectre of democracy (and then being consumed by the total war they could then not stop and failed to survive) or dictators wielding totalitarian power in megacidal projects, nationalism was a tool, not a cause.

But to make nationalism the great problem of European history is also to make the people of Europe the problem of European history, not inadequately accountable elites, given that nationalism is a sentiment among people. And if popular sentiments are the key problem, they cannot be allowed to be let loose. Hence the elite-dominated European project conceived as a restraint on the deemed problematic peoples.

Well, how has that worked out for them?

The notion of the EEC--to entangle the people of Europe so deeply with each other, and anchored in a common prosperity, that war became inconceivable--was a noble one.

The notion of the EU--to use ever-greater-union as ever-more-constraint-on-local-democracy--was not. It became a project of policy as applied knowing and (at best) very narrow bargaining. Not a project of policy-as-discovery process and broad social bargaining.

Clearly, more and more people have felt left out, ignored or worse. Moreover, as the policy reach of the EU has exceeded its actual knowledge and effectiveness, while having an invidious effect on policy accountability, it has become a mechanism for making policy worse, not better. Moreover, seeing the peoples of Europe as the problem has blocked learning anything from the resulting angry votes: treating voting patterns not as discovery process, but as confirmation of deeply problematic (indeed, profoundly counter-productive) assumptions built into the European project and oh-so-flattering to European elites.

The lack of a European demos is, of course, an advantage to evading accountability. But the consequence of that is poorer policy and more political alienation.

Entangling the people of Europe with each other should have been seen as a way of making certain sorts of politics less appealing, as a constraint on power holders, and those aspiring to the same. Not as a way to "manage" identities.

The original underlying structure of the EEC was a fine idea. The EU built on top of it, not so much. If one sees only the first while refusing to confront the second, one is going to continue to misdiagnose what is going on.

No, the peoples of Europe are not the problem. They never have been. Those who have seen them as the problem, they are the problem. What they thought they knew, they so didn't. They urgently need to rediscover a sense of policy-as-discovery-process, one properly based in broad social bargaining, not in demonstrably overblown notions of applied knowing.

[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]

Thursday, June 30, 2016

Free trade, expanding prosperity and technology dynamism are good things: but not everyone wins all the time.

The following things are very much good things: free trade, technological dynamism and expanding global prosperity. Free trade because it gives more people to sell to and buy from, to engage in gains from trade with. Technological dynamism because it allows more and more people to live longer and (in some very basic senses) freer and more prosperous lives. Expanding global prosperity, because it means living millions upon millions of people out of the grinding constraints of poverty.

But none of these good things happen without costs. Free trade expands some industries in some places and retards or destroys them in others. Technological dynamism creates new industries and devastates some existing ones. Expanding global prosperity effectively expands the global labour market (even without movement of people) and puts pressure on labour incomes in already prosperous societies--particularly at the bottom end of the skill level.

It is not enough to point to the good these things do, if that provides an excuse to ignore the costs they also create. It is true that their benefits are so great that it is easily possible to compensate losers and still make everyone materially better off. But that it is easily possible does not mean that it is actually being done.

Which where the need for attentive social policy comes in. Attentive in a range of senses: attentive to who is losing, how and why. Attentive to concerns of people disoriented by change. Attentive to how policy can make things better for those who are on the losing any of economic and technological change. Attentive to how existing policies may be getting in the way of doing that, or even exacerbating the negative effects of such changes.

Added to these waves of change has been social changes, particularly the Emancipation Sequence. This has been going on in the West for over two centuries now, but with considerable acceleration in recent decades. This adds to the disorientation, particularly through loss of previous assumptions and presumptions. Such changes take time to absorb and are not helped by folk on the side of such changes being vicious winners: that is, not showing some charity and accepting a reasonable transition period but instead insisting on full public endorsement of every possible aspect of changes by everyone while being extremely intolerant of any lingering commitment to previous patterns, no matter how deeply rooted in tradition and belief such may be.

Migrating disorientation
Part of the accelerating social change has been a broadening of migration patterns into Western countries. In some places, notably Australia and Canada, such migration has been generally well-managed and led to remarkably little social angst, despite high rates of migration. In the US less so. In Europe, immigration has generally been managed quite poorly.

Well-managed migration is diverse in its origins, involves high level of border control, and does not adversely shift the labour/capital balance (mainly by importing people with relatively high level of human capital). It also involves making the case and in terms that resonate widely with voters. Moral hectoring is not making the case, it is self-indulgent posturing in place of the effort of persuading.

Poorly managed migration involves a lack of border control (giving many people the feeling of having no say over something with the capacity to profoundly change their society), imports large lumps from particular sources (making the resident culture less obviously dominant and more challenged) of people with lower human capital (shifting the economic balance to capital and away from labour, putting more stress on labour markets and welfare systems) and fails to make the case that resonates broadly with voters. How migration is, or is not, managed makes a huge difference.

Poison and block
But if migration is turned into a Virtue signal where one has to be "for migration" to be Virtuous, then the problems are exacerbated. The complexities are flattened out--by failing to differentiate between attitudes to legal and illegal immigration; deprecating considering costs from migration; refusing to consider that different sources and selection criteria make a difference, that migrants are not, in fact, interchangeable and undifferentiated. Rather than a public debate, one ends up with a public shouting match between an undifferentiated acceptance deemed Virtuous and any concern over any aspect being Vicious (and subject to the rhetoric of denunciation: racist, nativist, xenophobic, etc). Using, as I noted in my previous post, the shouting of bigot! as a weapon of bigotry (opinion-bigotry, but still bigotry). Worse, it encourages a tendency towards poor policy by inhibiting attention to social costs and concerns.

One can see this nicely illustrated by George Soros being dismissive of voices of opposition before the Brexit vote. He, at least, is being wise after the fact about the effect of mismanaged migration. Many are so attached to their markers of Virtue that they continue to shriek after the fact: Bourbons of Virtue, who forget nothing and learn nothing--"correcting" others, not themselves.

Connected to this, supporting multiculturalism has become a particularly strong Virtue signal. But the reality is that multiculturalism is a social and policy experiment, which may not work. Nor is it remotely a morally compulsory policy for every society.

The problem with using policies as Virtue signals is not only does that poison debate, it also blocks consideration of facts deemed to be Virtue-awkward (or even Virtue-hostile). This is both potentially disastrous in terms of social outcomes (facts do not go away merely by being deemed wrong to mention) and helps further poison public debate, since ignoring facts on the ground inevitably becomes a process of ignoring, or even demonising, those concerned by said facts.

Stripping away social ballast
What also doesn't help is systematic attacks on common identities. A sense of national and cultural belonging can provide a sense of stability and even control: such things as, in the words of a recent post on the post-Brexit problems of the British Labour Party:
tradition, a respect for settled ways of life, a sense of place and belonging, a desire for home and rootedness, the continuity of relationships at work and in one’s neighbourhood.
provide a ballast against the disorienting effects of change. Attacking such identities as irretrievably stained with past sins (but somehow not attached to past achievements) attempts to knock away a comforting and stabilising part of social order, increasing the costs of social change--particularly their disorienting effect.

Creating unfortunate opportunities
Attentive policy flows out of listening politics. A political Party relies on balancing three things--rhetoric used, policies delivered and attention to voter concerns. The US Republican Party has got itself into The Donald mess because (at least at a federal level) it failed to pay sufficient attention to actual voter concerns while failing to match rhetoric to actions and actions to rhetoric.

But the Republican Party was also operating within a wider political and policy debate dynamic: part of the problem may well have been that its cosmopolitan operatives were inhibited from seeing how things seemed to its more traditionalist voters. As economist Luigi Zingales notes, if trust has been lost, the trick is not to blame those who no longer trust you (that just exacerbates the problem), but to work to rebuilt trust.

Which requires paying attention. Using policy positions as Virtue-markers blocks bothering to pay attention to--both the listening and attending to awkward facts. The result is an increase in political and policy dysfunction and, in particular, an increase in the numbers of angry and resentful voters. Who will inevitably start looking for folk willing to pay attention and who do not sneer at, or demonise, their concerns. Given enough economic and social stress, that gives an opportunity for people who, in more normal times, with sufficiently broadly attentive politics, would not get their chance.

Once such political entrepreneurs begin to get traction, it is further gist to the Virtue-demonising mill. And so the cycle builds with another spiral of Virtue-signalling and Vicious-demonising.

Once the spiral is underway, it is easy to point to the political entrepreneurs of angry and resentful politics and say "the problem is those dreadful people".  No, the problem is the refusal to pay attention by those whose proper role that is. Blaming others is so much easier than entertaining the problem that folk like oneself, folk with the beliefs which are so obviously Virtuous, are actually seriously problematic grit in the mechanisms of social adaptation via status-mongering and pseudo-comprehending contempt for those with different experiences and concerns.

Congenial framing as pseudo-comprehension
I say pseudo-comprehending because part of the game of Virtue is imposing a framing on folk and opinions which builds in dismissal of the opinion Other. It creates a crippled epistemology (pdf) which blocks attention and engagement with those outside the magic circle of the Virtuous. The illusion of knowing (and which deploying the rhetoric of denunciation expresses) blocks the capacity to genuinely see, let alone pay attention to: that's how systems of bigotry work.

But framings provide comfort: they are our go-to ways of making sense of the world. The illusion of knowing is a very comforting illusion, particularly if it flatters one's self-esteem. A British journalist's mordant tweet:
Notice we in the press went from: "OMG we never saw this coming!!" right into "We're experts on why they voted this way & what it means."?
provides an illustration of the easy go-to comfort of our framings.

As journalist Damon Linker has noted, the contradiction of the secular faith of Progressivism--that history has a particular direction, which the Virtuous know and are leading their cognitive inferiors into--has taken a major knock, hence the outrage of frustrated faith. But it is a really bad idea to turn politics into your substitute religion, given how antipathetic dogmatic faith can be to the give and take of persuasion and reasoned debate. Just as it is not good to lose sight of how one's sense of identity and attendant social experiences can be very different than other people's: and if you are attached to your identity, why wouldn't other people be attached to theirs?

Not everyone is a winner from the waves of globalisation and social change.  Refusing to pay attention to those who are not--demonising them for being, in effect, those disproportionately bearing the material and psychic costs of change--in itself, increases the costs to them and to the wider society. At little less smug moral self-satisfaction, and bit more open-minded attention, would go a long way to make things better.

But that would require giving up the psychic benefits of the aforementioned self-satisfaction, and its attendant sneering contempt for fellow citizens, in exchange for rather more moral humility and paying attention: thereby being better citizens and better participants in the wider society. Which requires breaking through considerable epistemic barriers and giving up considerable psychic benefits. Even incurring some social costs as one departs from (and so chips away at) the collective game of smug self-satisfaction.

And, as the song says, breaking up is hard to do.

[Cross-posted at Skepticlawyer.]